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When inflation is chronic, firms develop indexation practices that
automatically tie the growth of prices, wages, and other contracts to
the performance of some comprehensive price index. The microeconomic
advantages of indexation are evident and derive from the immuniza-
tion of the relative price system against the extravagances of inflation.
From a macroeconomic perspective, however, this practice has been
criticized for perpetuating the inflationary thrust, accentuating its vola-
tility, and influencing the process of relative price adjustments in the
face of real shocks. Those in charge of monetary policy generally op-
pose indexation under the argument that it raises the costs of reducing
or controlling inflation, and its elimination has been considered a pre-
requisite for ensuring the success of the drastic stabilization plans that
have been implemented in countries with a long history of inflation.
This position, however, is not fully shared in the academic litera-
ture. Essentially, one segment of the literature indicates that index-
ation favors the stabilization of output and facilitates the reduction of
inflation. The best-known proponent of this position is Friedman (1974),
who argues that automatic adjustments reduce the costs of anti-infla-
tionary policies, because they accelerate the speed with which the mon-
etary effects are transmitted to prices and wages and thus reduce the
impact on output. Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977) reach the same con-
clusion, arguing that indexation stabilizes output when monetary shocks
predominate, as in an inflationary stabilization plan. This favorable
interpretation of indexation is also reflected in empirical literature that
uses the coverage of automatic adjustment practices as a measure of
wage flexibility that reduces the costs of price stabilization (Ball, 1994b).
An important criticism of this line of argument is that it implicitly
assumes that indexation is synchronized and immediate (Simonsen, 1983).
The conclusions are substantially modified when these assumptions
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are removed and replaced by lagged, uncoordinated indexation, as
shown in the works of Bonomo and García (1994) and Jadresic (1995).1
The objective of the current paper is to study the relation between
price and wage indexation and the costs of reducing inflation in terms
of output; this relation is known as the sacrifice coefficient. The analysis
complements earlier works by Ball (1994a), Bonomo and García (1994),
and Jadresic (1995, 1996a, 1996b).
The emphasis, however, is on the consequences of the frequency
of indexation and other characteristics of labor contracts for both the
sacrifice coefficient and the output and price trends in an economy
that is undergoing an anti-inflationary stabilization program.
A priori arguments indicate that the relation between the sac-
rifice coefficient and the frequency of indexation is not monotonic:
as the frequency of indexation increases, the economy approaches
immediate, synchronized adjustment. In this case, the performance
of an economy that is responding to changes in monetary policy
converges with that of an economy characterized by fully flexible
prices, which brings the sacrifice coefficient to zero.
This work examines in depth the relation between the sacrifice
coefficient and the frequency of indexation, as well as the conse-
quences for recommendations on monetary policy. The methodol-
ogy used is to simulate the response of an economy characterized
by Calvo-type staggered contracts, which are extended to include
automatic adjustment clauses based on past inflation. The renego-
tiation of these price and wage contracts is unsynchronized, such
that there is a constant probability of reopening contracts in any
given moment. Intermediate contract openings in which only the
nominal level is corrected are also possible, in order to return the
contract to its real level prior to renegotiation. The microeconomic
explanations for this real rigidity are outside the scope of this pa-
per, but they are assumed to be in line with the literature on menu
costs (Mankiw and Romer, 1991). Following Calvo, the supply struc-
ture serves as the basis for deriving a very simple model using pa-
rameterized, linear, differential equations for the frequency of real
renegotiation and nominal adjustments.
The main consequence of automatic contract adjustments is to intro-
duce inertia into the inflationary process, that is, in the first derivative of
1. The literature drawing on Barro and Gordon (1983), which emphasizes the
strategic aspects of implementing monetary policy, is inconclusive with regard to
the impact of indexation on inflation and the authority’s incentives to exploit the
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the price level. This stands in contrast to the original formulation by
Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1979), which exhibits inertia only in the price level.
The next section derives the theoretical model of aggregate sup-
ply, while subsequent sections analyzes the response of prices and out-
put in the face of three types of inflationary reduction programs.
Specifically, section 2 describes a gradual inflationary reduction plan
with full credibility and simulates the model for different combinations
of parameters, concentrating on the frequency of indexation. Section 3
carries out the same study in the context of a shock plan, and section 4
examines the impact of a gradual plan with partial credibility. Finally,
the main conclusions of the paper are presented, together with the
implications for the persistence of moderate inflationary processes.
1. THE MODEL
The model, which is derived in continuous time, describes an
economy consisting of a continuum of firms in monopolistic competi-
tion.2 The relative price that maximizes each firm’s immediate utili-
ties is increasing in the level of aggregate output:
 , (1)
where 0 < v < 1, Y is the output level, p
* is the firm’s optimal price,
and P is the aggregate price level. Money and monetary policy enter
the model through the quantitative equation for money:
, (2)
where M is the money supply.3 The optimal price in terms of M and P
is deduced from equations 1 and 2:
. (3)
This structural modeling of demand is analogous to that used by
Ball (1994a), Bonomo and García (1994), and Jadresic (1991, 1995).
 2. With the exception of the supply equation, the model is analogous to that
used by Ball (1994a), Bonomo and García (1994), and Jadresic (1995).
 3. Alternatively, the model can be extended for the case of an open economy
and the real exchange rate can replace the role of real money in the determina-
tion of output.
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It differs from these works in the specification of aggregate supply,
which is an extension of the model outlined in Calvo (1983) and which
introduces automatic adjustments. Calvo’s model incorporates a formu-
lation in which the duration of the contracts is exponentially distributed,
in contrast to the fixed horizon used in the other studies cited. This
artifice simplifies the calculation and facilitates the study of the conse-
quences of alternative types of wage contracts on stabilization costs.
Each firm sporadically corrects its price. These adjustments are
random events that occur with a constant probability, independently
both of previous corrections undertaken by the firm and of current
and past corrections undertaken by other firms in the economy. The
price adjustments can be either nominal or real. Nominal adjustments
correct the price to reflect the degree of inflation that has accumu-
lated since the last price revision. Real adjustments integrally revise
the contract, that is, in both its nominal and real components. Nominal
adjustments occur with a probability per unit of time, and real adjust-
ments occur with probability  per unit of time. Therefore, in each mo-
ment dt, a portion of contracts, ( + )dt, is revised, of which the fraction
is fixed on the basis of both actual and future conditions, while the
remaining contracts only correct for past inflation.
The firm’s effective nominal price is divided into two components:
, (4)
where z () is the real premium negotiated in  and q () is the nominal
component of the contract signed in  and revised in ', equal to the
prices P (' ) prevailing at that moment. The firms are indexed in (,')
as corresponds to the moment in which they signed the real and nomi-
nal components, respectively.
The firm sets the real premium knowing that the real and nominal
revisions are sporadic. The objective is to equalize the expected average
price during the life of the contract with the average optimal price
that is expected in this same period,4
 . (5)
 4. Equation 5 can be interpreted as the optimal result of a quadratic approxima-
tion of the firm’s true objective function. The discount factor is ignored for simplicity
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In addition, the nominal component q (t,s) of the contracts signed
in t are defined by the following equation:5
Differentiating z relative to t produces
(7)
where (t) is the immediate inflation rate.
The price level is obtained by aggregating current prices for the
different cohorts of firms. It is assumed that the distribution of the
cohorts is stationary, such that the distribution in (the moment of the
last real adjustment) is exponential in (,t) with parameter , and
the distribution in ' (the moment of the last nominal adjustment)
is exponential between (,t) with parameter + . The general
price level is then derived as
(8)
This equation generalizes Calvo’s model (1983) to include adjust-
ments for past inflation (	). As in Calvo (1983) and Taylor (1979),
the price level is predetermined, and it is not fully adjusted in response
to either expected or unexpected changes in the money supply. This
gives rise to the nonneutrality of the money supply and monetary policy.
The innovation of this supply equation relative to the earlier models
is that inflation, the first derivative of the price level, also exhibits
inertia.
The immediate inflation rate is obtained by differentiating the price
level equation:
, (9)
where Q (t) is the average price level implicit in the nominal compo-
nent of the contracts in force, that is, the second integral on the right
 5. Equation 6 is obtained from the solution to the differential and border
equations:                                      and                   .
(6)
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hand side of equation 8. This equation decomposes inflation into
two parts. The first component reflects the premium on the price
level in new contracts, z(t). This factor can change instantaneously
in response to both observed and anticipated changes in the
economy’s monetary and nonmonetary conditions. The second com-
ponent comprises the model’s innovation relative to Calvo. The
variable P(t) – Q(t) is a predetermined variable that reflects the
average size of the nominal corrections stemming from indexation.
Algebraic work generates an alternative form to equation 9, which
more clearly reveals the determinants of inflation in the model:
                                              expectations
(10)
                                 inertia
Current inflation is determined by expectations with regard to the
output gap and future inflation, together with the evolution of lagged
inflation. Equation 10 demonstrates that the frequency of indexation, ,
has effects on both expectations and inertia. Greater frequency reduces
the weight of future inflation, because automatic indexation keeps this
component up to date and increases the weight of lagged inflation, with
greater weight on recent observations of the inflation rate. This struc-
tural supply equation reveals that empirical inflationary inertia can be
generated by both indexation and inertia in the expectations components.
In Calvo’s model, as well as in Taylor (1979), this is equivalent to
assuming that  = 0, which implies that the inflation rate is totally
flexible and anticipatory, even when the price level exhibits inertia.
This flexibility in the inflation rate is not supported empirically, how-
ever. This variable generally exhibits a high degree of positive serial
autocorrelation, although few empirical studies explicitly express
the identifying assumptions that are necessary for distinguishing
between structural inertia stemming from indexation and inertia
in the inflation fundamentals.
Finally, the variable Q follows the differential equation
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The system’s path is summarized by the three differential, con-
stant coefficient equations 8, 10, and 11, which are written in matrix
terms as
where the vector X(t) = [z(t),P(t),Q(t)]' and the matrices A and B
are 3x3 and 3x1, respectively. The dynamic system defined by A has
two negative characteristic values, which are convergent, and one
positive, which is divergent, such that the dynamic equilibrium has a
saddle-path configuration. The variables P(t) and Q(t) are predeter-
mined, and the variable z(t) is adjusted to situate the system on the
convergent path.
The dynamic-system solution requires stipulating the performance
of the exogenous variable in the system (that is, monetary policy or the
money supply). This topic is addressed in the following sections.
2. GRADUAL STABILIZATION WITH FULL CREDIBILITY
2.1 Gradual Stabilization
This section studies an inflationary stabilization experiment that
is analogous to that proposed by Ball (1994a), but extended to include
indexation of contracts. Given the assumption that t 
0, money grows
at a constant rate equal to , and the firms expect that this situation
will be maintained forever.
M(t) = t and (13a)
(13b)
where t < 0.
It is assumed that this situation has been maintained for a long time,
such that the economy is in a stationary state defined by the conditions
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These three conditions give rise to the conclusions that in the
long run, the price level should equalize the money supply, the
inflation rate is , and the real premium, z, is constant:
where t < 0.
If t = 0, however, the central bank announces an unexpected
plan for gradual inflationary reduction, exponentially bringing the
issue rate to zero with velocity :
, (16)
where t 0 and M' is the announcement of the money growth rate.6
The dynamic-system solution is described in the appendix.
2.2 Choice of Parameters
The model is derived in terms of final prices, but the empirical
counterpart to the parameters  and  is calibrated according to the
typical characteristics of wage contracts in Chile. In this case, equa-
tion 8 is reinterpreted to represent the average level of nominal wages
in the economy, and firms are assumed to set their prices with a con-
stant margin over the unitary labor costs.
Jadresic (1991) uses data on collectively negotiated contracts and
econometric estimates of the aggregate performance of the wage in-
dex. He concludes that the typical wage contract in the Chilean
economy stipulates semiannual automatic adjustments and biannual
renegotiation. If these values are taken as a measure of the respec-
tive distributions, then  = 0.5 and  +  = 2.0, and thus the fraction
 6. Ball (1994a) and Bonomo and García (1994) examine the case in which the
issue rate is linearly brought to zero. This modification does not change the qualita-
tive conclusions obtained in the present paper.
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that takes future economic conditions into account when renegoti-
ating their contracts is  = 0.25.7
However, other moments in the empirical distribution of adjust-
ments are not satisfactorily adjusted through the exponential function
imposed by the theoretical model. Jadresic (1995) indicates that the
frequency of adjustment is very concentrated in the semiannual time
frame, at least within the collectively negotiated contracts. In 1990,
nearly 10 percent featured adjustment clauses between one and three
months, 80 percent between four and six months, and 10 percent over
six months. This distribution contrasts with that generated by the ex-
ponential function with  = 0.5 and  +  = 2.0, in which 38 percent of
workers have adjustments less than or equal to three months and 62
percent have adjustments less than or equal to six months. The tails of
the exponential distribution are wider at both extremes. This suggests
that the impact of announcements on monetary policy are transmitted
more rapidly to prices, because a greater fraction of workers adjust
their prices in the short term. At the same time, however, the real
effects are delayed longer, because the tail of the distribution is longer.
The parameter v reflects the complementarity of the price deci-
sions. Ball (1994a, 1994b) and Bonomo and García (1994) use v = 1.0
and v = 0.25, whereas Jadresic (1991, 1995) only considers v = 1.0. For
the purpose of comparison with the results in these articles, v is set at
0.25 in the tables and figures presented in this paper; the discussion
signals quantitative and qualitative differences between this case and
v = 1.0.
2.3 Output, Money, and Inflation
In the base exercise, the parameters are set at  = 0.5 and
 +  = 2.0. Inflation starts at 6 percent, and the money growth rate
falls at the velocity of = 0.46. The average life of the stabilization
program—that is, the time it takes the money growth rate to reach 3
percent—is eight quarters. The model defined by equation 12 deter-
mines the price and output trends, which are used to generate some
indicators that summarize the results of the stabilization plan.
Figure 1 plots the trends in money, output, and inflation. For
t = 0, which represents the moment in which the policy is announced
and the beginning of the monetary adjustment process, the figure shows
 7. Alternatively, if this fraction is interpreted as the median, then  = 0.35 and
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an immediate, moderate drop in the inflation rate, from 6.0 to 5.3
percent. The firms and workers that renegotiate prices anticipate the
gradual expansion of the disinflation process and incorporate it into
their price decisions. This contributes to immediately reducing the
real premium, z, relative to its historical level, which slows the pace of
inflation despite the fact that the money issue rate initially stays at its
historic level of  = 6.0 percent. Consequently, the economy enters a
slightly expansionary phase, with real money balances and production
growing above the long-term rate. The inflation rate continues to fall,
but more slowly than the growth rate of money, because there is a
holdover of inflation in those prices that need to recover their real
historic level and also because the economy is expanding.
The expansionary process comes to an end after two quarters,
when the accumulated output gap reaches just 0.2 percent. From
this moment on, the inflation rate exceeds the money growth rate,
and real balances and, therefore, output begin to fall. In the seventh
quarter, the economy enters a persistent, though not very deep, re-
cession. The economy hits bottom in the fifth year, with a negative
output gap of –1.0 percent, and then gradually and variably begins to
recover its long-term level.
The accumulated losses in the contractionary period exceed the gains
observed in the expansionary period, such that the process of inflation-
ary stabilization gives rise to a net sacrifice. The sacrifice coefficient, S,
Figure 1. Trends in Output, Money, and Inflation under
Gradual Stabilization and Full Credibilitya
Source: Author’s calculations.
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is defined as the accumulation through time of output losses caused
by each point of permanent inflation reduction:
In the base exercise, this equation yields S = 0.92.8
Inflation falls slowly, but the trend is relatively in line with the money
issue rate. It takes nearly seventeen quarters for inflation to reach 1 per-
cent; in the case of the money issue rate, it takes almost fifteen quarters.
Considering that the model is highly stylized, it is surprising that
the sacrifice coefficient predicted for this experiment by the model is
realistic and falls in the center of the range typically observed in em-
pirical studies on stabilization experiences. Ball (1994b) examines a
large sample of disinflation processes in industrialized countries for
the period 1960-91. The observed values for S vary between 0 and 3.6,
with a sample average of 0.8 (annual data) and 1.4 (quarterly data).
2.4 Frequency of Wage Adjustments
The effect of indexation on the inflationary dynamics of the economy
and on the costs of stabilization are evaluated in table 1 and figure 2, which
show, respectively, the sacrifice coefficient and the trends in inflation and
output for different combinations of the frequency of indexation () and
real adjustment (). As the table indicates, for an economy without index-
ation ( = 0.5 and  = 0.01), the model predicts a negative sacrifice coeffi-
cient (S = –5.30), that is, a net output gain associated with stabilization.
The corresponding panel in figure 2 shows the output and inflation trends
for a subset of the result in table 1. For t = 0, inflation falls immediately
and more drastically than in the former example, from 6.0 to 2.2 percent.
Its later convergence is slower, however, taking almost twenty-one quar-
ters to reach 1 percent. The initial drop in inflation is larger because the
nominal component of the renovated contracts has a much longer effec-
tive duration (as does the real component), which causes the premium, z,
to encompass a larger fraction of the expected reduction in the money
issue rate. The difference between the inflation rate and the money issue
rate strongly expands the economy, peaking at the end of eleven quarters
with a positive gap of 3.9 percent. The convergence with long-term equilib-
rium is monotonic, such that the economy never enters a recessive phase.
8. The qualitative results of the model under study are independent of the
initial inflation rate, while the quantitative results are directly proportional to it.
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Frequency of
nominal Frequency of real adjustments ()
indexation ()  0.25  0.50  1.00   2.00  10.00
0.0 –11.30 –5.30 –2.04 –0.68 –0.04
0.5 6.64 0.01 –0.75 –0.43 –0.03
1.5 5.04 0.92 –0.11 –0.20 –0.03
3.5 3.13 0.76 0.08 –0.06 –0.02
10.0 1.46 0.40 0.09 0.00 –0.01
Table 1. The Sacrifice Coefficient under Gradual
Stabilization and Full Credibility as a Function of the
Frequency of Nominal Indexation and Real Adjustmentsa
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The sacrifice coefficient, S, was derived for the indicated combinations of and  based on an adjustment
velocity in the money growth rate of  = 0.46, with  = 0.25.
Figure 2. Output and Inflation Trends and the Frequency
of Nominal and Real Adjustmentsa
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Model simulation with gradual stabilization velocity ( = 0.46) and  = 0.25 for different values of the
frequency of nominal () and real () adjustments.
 = 0.5,  = 0.01  = 2.0,  = 0.01
 = 0.25,  = 1.5  = 0.5,  = 1.5  = 2.0,  = 1.5
 = 0.25,  = 3.5  = 0.5,  = 3.5  = 2.0, = 3.5
 = 0.25,  = 0.01195 Indexation, Inflationary Inertia, and the Sacrifice Coefficient
This counterintuitive result is characteristic of models featur-
ing staggered prices and gradual stabilization. Given gradual stabi-
lization and full credibility, firms and wage earners anticipate the
success of the stabilization program and incorporate in advance the
impact of the reduction of the money issue rate on prices. This in-
duces an initial expansion of output, because prices fall more rapidly
than the money stock. Ball uses a Taylor-type model to demon-
strate that neither absolute nor net output losses are generated by
a linear reduction of the issue rate with a duration greater than or
equal to 0.68 times the length of the contracts.
This theoretical result directly contradicts both a long macro-
economic tradition and most of the available empirical evidence.
However, introducing indexation into the aggregate supply reverses
this result. The automatic adjustments create inertia in the infla-
tionary process, which severely restricts the conditions of credibil-
ity and gradual implementation that are necessary for triggering a
net expansion in the economy, rather than a net sacrifice coeffi-
cient, in response to the reduction of inflation. Bonomo and García
(1994) conclude that by introducing nominal adjustments over half
the life of the contract, the minimum duration of the linear stabili-
zation process that avoids the recessive cycle is just under three
times the length of the contract. Indexation also affects the timing
of the announcement of the stabilization program. In the model
without indexation, the initiation of a moderate stabilization pro-
cess should be announced in advance by at least one and a half
times the average contract length in order to avoid a recession. In
the model with indexation, the minimum period increases to four
and a half times. The authors conclude that even when automatic
adjustments increase the frequency of the nominal price adjust-
ments, indexation increases the costs of the disinflation process.
The pernicious effect of indexation on stabilization costs is cor-
roborated in this paper, but this does not mean that greater index-
ation, in the sense of more frequent adjustments for accumulated
inflation, will necessarily be damaging for economic performance.
The effect of the frequency of indexation on stabilization costs is not
monotonic. The costs of stabilization rise when the frequency of
indexation increases from zero to positive, but for some value of ,
the marginal impact becomes negative again to the extent that the
economy recovers nominal neutrality. Essentially, when the adjust-
ment is almost instantaneous, the economy recovers its neutrality
in the face of nominal policies, and the costs of stabilization (and the
sacrifice coefficient) approach zero. This result is consistent with
the findings of Friedman (1974), Gray (1976), and Fischer (1977).Luis Oscar Herrera 196
For  = 0.5, increasing indexation from a semiannual to a quar-
terly frequency reduces the accumulated net output losses from 5.5
to 4.6 percent, and the sacrifice coefficient falls from 0.92 to 0.76 (see
table 1). The trend is plotted in figure 2. The initial impact on infla-
tion is slightly lower, but inflation then falls more rapidly in conjunc-
tion with the money issue rate. The pattern is similar to that found in
the base exercise, but the size and duration of the cycle’s expansion-
ary and contractionary phases are smaller. When the frequency in-
creases to a monthly rate, the costs of stabilization are reduced by
half (S = 0.40). The stabilization costs also fall if the frequency is
reduced from semiannual to annual, and the sacrifice coefficient
reaches just 0.01. Thus within the structures examined, and given
the typical biannual structure of price contracts, semiannual adjust-
ment has the highest associated stabilization costs, since both in-
creases and decreases in the frequency of indexation reduce the costs.
Changes in the frequency of real adjustments, , also have a
nonmonotonic impact on stabilization costs. Infrequent adjustments
tend to generate a positive expansionary effect, but as the frequency
increases, the economy tends to recover its nominal neutrality.
The relation between the frequency of nominal and real adjust-
ments, however, should be one of substitution. As described above,
the typical contract in the Chilean economy has a two-year horizon
with semiannual adjustments. In the U.S. economy, the typical con-
tract is shorter, usually lasting one year, and it does not contemplate
intermediate indexation; staggered contracts have an average dura-
tion of three years (Taylor, 1998). There is thus a substitution
between the frequency of indexation and the frequency of full renego-
tiation. In this light, it is relevant to reexamine the analysis pre-
sented in table 1, compensating for the changes in the frequency of
indexation with changes in the frequency of real adjustment. Table
2 shows the sacrifice coefficient associated with combinations of
the total frequency of adjustments,  + , and the proportion,
which represents the fraction of prices that are renegotiated in each
moment with attention to the future evolution of the economy. The
results point to an inverse (and monotonic) relation between these
two parameters and the sacrifice coefficient. As the frequency of real
or nominal adjustments increases, for any given value of , the sacri-
fice coefficient approaches zero, and as the proportion of prices that
are fixed with attention to future prices and the future output gap
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3. IMMEDIATE STABILIZATION WITH FULL CREDIBILITY
The speed at which the stabilization program is implemented af-
fects the output and inflation trends, as well as the net costs of the
program. The faster the reduction in the money growth rate, the shorter
the duration and narrower the scope of the initial boom and the greater
the depth of the later recession—and thus the greater the total costs
of the stabilization process. This section analyzes the case of a sudden,
drastic stabilization program (see figure 3). The issue rate moves im-
mediately from  to zero, and equation 16 is replaced by
where t  0. This equation corresponds to the extreme case in
which  tends toward infinity.
Table 3 shows the inflation and output trends for the case of imme-
diate stabilization with the parameters of the base exercise ( = 0.5 and
 = 1.5). For t = 0, inflation initially falls to 4.5 percent and then continues
falling until it reaches 1 percent after a year and a half. Because the
inflation rate exceeds the issue rate, the economy immediately enters a
recession, which bottoms out after nine quarters with a gap of nearly 4.5
percent. The economy then slowly recovers its long-term level, and mi-
nor cyclical fluctuations are produced. The total cost of the stabilization
process is equivalent to 18 percent of output (that is, S = 2.0), as com-
pared to the lower cost of 6 percent described in the previous section.
0.10 113.80 40.00 7.09 1.22 0.09
0.25 35.30 6.46 0.92 0.07 –0.02
0.50 4.78 0.01 –0.31 –0.14 –0.03
0.75 –2.66 –1.49 –0.58 –0.19 –0.03
0.90 –4.70 –1.90 –0.65 –0.20 –0.04
Table 2. The Sacrifice Coefficient under Gradual
Stabilization and Full Credibility as a Function
of the Frequency of Adjustmentsa
Real adjustments
as fraction of Frequency of total adjustments ( + )
total ()  0.5 1.0 2.0  4.0  10.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The sacrifice coefficient, S, was derived for the indicated combinations of  +  and  based on an adjustment
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A comparison of table 3 and table 1 generates two observations.
First, relative to gradual stabilization, the cost of immediate stabili-
zation in terms of output increases for all combinations of the pa-
rameters. The sacrifice coefficient is positive in all cases. Second,
the qualitative standard of the relation between the frequency of
indexation and the sacrifice coefficient remains nonmonotonic. In
comparison with the base example ( = 0.5 and  = 1.5), increasing
the frequency of indexation from semiannual to quarterly adjust-
ments reduces the sacrifice coefficient from 3.0 to 2.2, while reduc-
ing the frequency from semiannual to annual adjustments increases
the sacrifice coefficient to 3.25. The total elimination of indexation,
however, reduces the sacrifice coefficient to just 0.21. Thus a par-
tial reduction of the indexation frequency does not necessarily re-
duce the costs of stabilization, although its total elimination does.
Figure 3. Trends in Output, Money, and Inflation under







Table 3. The Sacrifice Coefficient under Immediate
Stabilization and Full Credibilitya
Frequency of real adjustments ()
0.25 0.50 1.00 2.00 10.00
0.0 1.51 0.21 0.03 0.00 0.00
0.5 13.20 3.25 0.66 0.11 0.00
1.5 9.25 3.00 0.83 0.19 0.00
3.5 6.10 2.18 0.72 0.21 0.01





a. Model simulation of the base exercise (= 1.5 and  = 0.5), with immediate stabilization velocity and  = 0.25.
–20 2468 1 0
No. of years from start of stabilization program (t = 0)
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The sacrifice coefficient, S, was derived for the indicated combinations of  and  based on an adjustment
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4. STABILIZATION WITH PARTIAL CREDIBILITY
Thus far, the analysis has assumed full credibility. The announce-
ment of a stabilization program is unexpected, but it is fully incorpo-
rated into the expectations and decisions of the price formation. This
section investigates the consequences of relaxing this assumption,
introducing the possibility of abandoning the announced plan before
its completion. It is assumed that the monetary authorities begin to
implement the money path defined below (equation 18), but in each
moment there is a probability h that the stabilization effort will be
stopped at that point. If the central bank abandons the plan, then
expectations are that the issue rate will remain forever at the level
prevailing at that time. Consequently, if the plan is abandoned in ,
the issue rate follows the path,
(18)
The probability h measures the program’s credibility; a higher
value for h indicates a lower credibility.
4.1 Expected Trend with Partial Credibility
The effective trend for the system depends on the stochastic
realization of abandoning the program. Given the system’s linear-
ity, however, the expected system trend can be calculated on the
basis of the expected money trend defined in equation 18. This can
be written as
. (19)
The dynamic system should verify the following limit conditions:
(20a)
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Table 4 shows the expected sacrifice coefficient associated with the
different frequency parameters for the case of gradual stabilization
with partial credibility.9 The parameter h is set arbitrarily at 0.69, which
is equivalent to a 0.5 probability of the program’s being abandoned
within a year. In all cases, the expected cost of the stabilization effort
is higher than for the corresponding case with full credibility presented
in table 1. The expectation that the program will be abandoned early
delays the incorporation of the expected money trend into the evolu-
tion of recontracted prices. This reduces the length and breadth of the
initial expansion, as well as the length and depth of the contractionary
phase in those cases featuring recession. This observation confirms
the results achieved by Ball (1994a, b) and Bonomo and García (1994) in
the context of models based on staggered wages with a fixed horizon.
As in the previous cases, the expected stabilization costs remain
nonmonotonic relative to the frequency of indexation. Essentially,
table 4 qualitatively replicates the results in table 1, but at a higher
cost level. Increasing the frequency of indexation from semiannual to
quarterly and from quarterly to monthly reduces the expected sacri-
fice coefficient. However, lowering the frequency of indexation to an-
nual adjustments or to zero also reduces the sacrifice coefficient.
A reduction in the credibility of the stabilization program (expressed
in an increase in the credibility parameter, h) increases the costs asso-
ciated with every case in table 4, but it does not alter the nature of the
qualitative results. When the program’s credibility is reduced by half
(h = 1.38), the sacrifice coefficient rises from 1.8 to 2.2 in the base
example. Increasing the frequency from semiannual to quarterly in-
dexation reduces the coefficient to 1.6, while the move to annual index-
ation reduces it to 2.0.
9. In this case, the sacrifice coefficient is defined as .
Table 4. The Sacrifice Coefficient under Gradual Stabilization
and Partial Credibilitya
0.0 –4.4 –2.6 –1.2 –0.5 0.0
0.5 9.9 1.5 –0.2 –0.3 0.0
1.5 7.0 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.0
3.5 4.4 1.3 0.3 0.0 0.0
10.0 2.2 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The sacrifice coefficient, S, was derived for the indicated combinations of  and  based on an adjustment
velocity in the money issue rate of  = 0.46, with  = 0.25 and a credibility parameter of h = 0.69.
Frequency of real adjustments ()
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4.2 Effective Realizations with Partial Credibility
In addition to calculating the expected inflation and output trends,
the model can be used to obtain their evolution for effective realiza-
tions of , which is the date at which the stabilization program is aban-
doned. The expected money and price trends are calculated in each
moment for t <, conditional on the implementation of the program up
to that point, and the implications for the price and output trends are
derived for that moment. The expected money and price trends are
then recalculated for , conditional on the program’s abandonment at
that point, and the implications for the output trend are derived from
 forward. Figures 4 and 5 show the inflation and output trends for
three different abandonment dates and different frequencies of index-
ation. The abandonment dates are calculated to represent the tenth,
fiftieth, and ninetieth percentiles of the probability distribution of ;
they therefore provide a reference for the distribution of the results
for each configuration of the parameters. Figure 4 illustrates the case
of quarterly indexation, and figure 5 the case of monthly indexation.
Figure 4. Trends in Output, Money, and Inflation under
Gradual Stabilization, Partial Credibility, and
Semiannual Indexationa
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Model simulation of the base exercise ( = 1.5 and  = 0.5), with gradual stabilization velocity ( = 0.46),
partial credibility (h = 0.69), and  = 0.25. The program is abandoned in  = 10 percent,  = 50 percent, and  = 90
percent.
No. of years from start of stabilization program (t = 0)
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A comparison of the depth and breadth of the economic cycle for
the different degrees of indexation reveals that more frequent index-
ation reduces the volatility of output. When indexation is monthly and
the stabilization program is extended beyond expectations ( = 90 per-
cent), this produces a recession that reaches its low point in the course
of the third year, with a maximum gap slightly greater than 1 percent,
and the economy accumulates a cost of 3.2 percentage points of output
(S = 0.7). When the indexation is semiannual (the base exercise), the
total cost increases to 9.9 percentage points of output (S = 1.9). In the
absence of automatic indexation, the initial expansionary effect pre-
dominates and the economy receives a net benefit.
These results fully support the intuition outlined in Gray (1976)
and Fischer (1977). In the face of monetary shocks such as the imple-
mentation of a stabilization program, greater indexation reduces
the volatility of output and increases the volatility of inflation.
Figure 5. Trends in Output, Money, and Inflation under
Gradual Stabilization, Partial Credibility, and
Monthly Indexationa
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. Model simulation of the base exercise ( = 11.5 and  = 0.5), with gradual stabilization velocity ( = 0.46),
partial credibility (h = 0.69), and  = 0.25. The program is abandoned in  = 10 percent,  = 50 percent, and
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented above gives rise to two basic conclusions.
First, price and wage indexation increases the costs of reducing
inflation. In the model of price (or wage) formation characterized by
rational expectations and a degree of adjustment inflexibility, in-
dexation introduces inertia into the inflationary process and in-
creases the sacrifice coefficient. For the base model, given semiannual
average adjustment and biannual contracts, the sacrifice coefficient
fluctuates between 0.9 and 3.0, depending on the type stabilization
program (gradual versus drastic) and its credibility.
Second, the relation between the frequency of adjustment and
the sacrifice coefficient is nonmonotonic. The costs of stabilization
increase when the frequency of indexation moves from zero to posi-
tive, but for some value of  the marginal impact returns to nega-
tive as the economy recovers its nominal neutrality. Therefore,
decreasing the frequency of indexation in the economy, which usu-
ally happens when inflation is low, does not necessarily reduce the
sacrifice coefficient, and increasing the frequency of adjustment is
not necessarily damaging. In the base model, the semiannual ad-
justment structure constitutes a minimum, such that any move-
ment—whether toward more or less frequent adjustments—reduces
the cost of stabilizing inflation.
This last observation helps explain the persistence of moder-
ate inflationary processes of 20 to 40 percent. The sacrifice
coefficient tends to increase for intermediate levels of indexation
such as annual, semiannual, or quarterly, but it drops to practi-
cally zero when adjustments are made monthly. If this adjustment
frequency responds positively to the inflation level, then the
economy may find itself caught in a trap of moderate inflation. For
low levels of average inflation, individuals and firms do not index
their contracts. This keeps the costs of the stabilization plan at
relatively low levels, and the benefits are felt almost immediately.
This holds when the plan enjoys full credibility and is designed
under a strategy of gradual implementation. As the average infla-
tion level increases and individuals and firms begin to use automatic
adjustment practices to protect themselves from inflation, the costs
of the stabilization program rise significantly and the program’s
impact on inflation is delayed. The effects are multiplied when the
plan’s credibility is questionable. These conditions reduce the netLuis Oscar Herrera 204
benefits associated with the plan, or at least the short-term ben-
efits observed by the authorities, such that inflation tends to take
root in the economy while there are no political incentives to reduce
it. When both the level of inflation and the frequency of indexation
rise, the benefits of reducing inflation increase. At some point the
stabilization costs begin to fall, until the authorities once again have
incentives for reducing or eliminating inflation.205 Indexation, Inflationary Inertia, and the Sacrifice Coefficient
APPENDIX
The Model Solution with Gradual Stabilization
and Full Credibility
The dynamic system formed by equation 12 is written as
The homogeneous part of the system has the following general
solution for :
,
where i and vi are the characteristic values and vectors associ-
ated with the rectangular matrix A and where C1, C2, and C3 are
constants determined on the basis of the limit conditions that should
satisfy the system, namely,
p( 0 ) = 0 ,
,  and
One of the equation's characteristic values is negative; it can there-
fore be eliminated to ensure that the system converges with its station-
ary state.
The general solution for the dynamic system formed by equation 12
takes the form
where t 0 and the constants K1 and K2 are determined by the
indeterminate coefficient method. The solution for the model fea-
turing immediate stabilization corresponds to the limit of the above
solution when .
 t X
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